In 2009, India updated its 2004 Maritime Doctrine, highlighting the need to develop naval nuclear deterrence capabilities to safeguard its national security. When India officially commissioned its first nuclear-powered, ballistic missile-carrying submarine, the INS Arihant in March 2016, India joined a small group of countries possessing nuclear submarines, namely: the US, Russia, China, France, and the UK. The Arihant is India’s first domestically built nuclear submarine, expanding the country’s ‘nuclear triad’ capabilities, which consist of air-launched, land-based, and sea-based nuclear weapons. The benefit of these additional naval nuclear assets is increased stealth. Nuclear-powered submarines are generally faster, quieter, and can remain underwater longer than conventional diesel-electric submarines. Moreover, Indian airborne or land-based military vessels and missiles may struggle with being discovered by foreign air defenses and satellites, whereas submarines hidden in the ocean may remain undetected. This adds new dimensions to the security dilemma between India, Pakistan, and China in the Indian Ocean.
At an estimated cost of USD 13 billion, the INS Arihant is a showpiece of India’s fleet. The submarine can carry K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with a range of 470 miles (750 km) as well as K-4 SLMBs with a range of 2,200 miles (3,500 km). The test-firing of a K-4 SLMB in 2016 proved unsuccessful, however, requiring India to further develop the technology. If future K-4 test-launches are successful, SLBM-equipped nuclear submarines will strengthen India’s deterrence capabilities as China’s naval strategy becomes increasingly assertive and hostile relations between Pakistan and India create regional frictions.
India’s ambition to grow its nuclear military assets has delivered substantial results. According to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, India’s nuclear arsenal is estimated at 130 to 140 nuclear warheads. Available plutonium stocks in India would even permit the production of additional warheads, amounting to a potential inventory of 150 to 200 weapons in total. Although China and Pakistan surpass India’s nuclear arsenal with an estimated 290 and 160 nuclear warheads respectively, India is cementing its military foothold in the Indian Ocean by upgrading its nuclear submarine fleet. In 2012, the Indian Navy leased a Russian nuclear-powered attack submarine, the INS Chakra, for USD 1 billion with plans to maintain the submarine until 2022. Additionally, India signed another 10-year contract with Russia in 2018 to lease an Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, the INS Chakra III, for USD 3 billion to replace the older INS Chakra. The delivery of the INS Chakra III will be completed by 2025. Finally, India is reportedly planning to commission a second domestically built nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, the INS Arighat, in the second half of 2019.
After the Arihant completed its first deterrence patrol in November 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated that India’s nuclear triad will ensure global peace and stability. Yet it appears that this military build-up could in fact raise tensions with Pakistan and China. Strategic frictions in the Indian Ocean would not only affect India, Pakistan, and China, but also regional littoral states that may feel threatened. Moreover, the US may intervene if China’s presence and assertiveness in the Indian Ocean increases. When China began projecting its power and defending its interests in the Indo-Pacific, the US administration under President Donald Trump made the Indo-Pacific a top regional priority in its 2017 National Security Strategy. A military encounter between India, Pakistan, China, and the US could potentially escalate tensions in the region.
A factor that likely spurred on India’s nuclear naval program was the patrol of a Chinese Shang-class nuclear submarine in the Indian Ocean in 2013. With a higher speed of 30 knots, the Shang-class submarine could outmaneuver India’s Arihant submarine, which can dive at a speed of only 24 knots. The acquisition of the INS Chakra III, which is expected to have a submerged speed of 30 knots, will aid India in comparing with China’s submarine assets. Nevertheless, India must also improve its ballistic missile technology to compete with China’s JL-2 intercontinental SLBM, which has a range of 4,500 miles (7,400 km). Considering that India’s intermediate-range K-4 missile is still under development, India’s attainment of intercontinental SLBMs, which typically have a minimum range of 3,400 miles (5,500 km), remains a goal of the distant future.
By contrast, India’s naval nuclear arsenal appears sufficient to deter Pakistan, which possesses neither a nuclear-powered submarine nor comparable submarine-launched missiles. Threatened by India’s naval military built-up, Pakistan is developing its sea-based deterrence and adding the Babur-3 nuclear-capable submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) to its arsenal. The SLCM, however, has a range of only 280 miles (450 km), falling below the wider range of India’s K-15 SLBM.
In conclusion, India is pursuing a maritime deterrence strategy in its backyard, the Indian Ocean, to ensure national security and keep rivals at bay. If the strategic balance in the Indian Ocean is destabilized, it would have serious implications not only for the militaries of involved states but also for international trade. The Indian Ocean is a vital sea lane of communication, connecting Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, East Asia, the US, and Europe. Thus, conflict in the region would obstruct safe maritime trade. Yet given that both China and India have committed to a no first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons policy and China reaffirmed this commitment in its July 2019 Defense White Paper, it is likely that neither of the two states will resort to open conflict in the Indian Ocean. This NFU policy, however, does not guarantee that the two countries would not escalate tensions if they considered mutual threats grave enough.
