Prospects of Future U.S.-North Korea Negotiations

While the first diplomatic negotiations between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore in June 2018 suggested positive developments, the second summit in Hanoi in late February 2019 is considered a failure. The governments in Washington, D.C. and Pyongyang are currently in a deadlock, but seem willing to re-engage. This allows for the possibility of a third summit between the two leaders.

President Trump confirmed that he is ready to advance diplomatic relations with North Korea by the end of 2019. One of the United States’ main concerns in future diplomatic discussions will be North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) currently possesses Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), but their stability and accuracy are not developed enough to hit the U.S. mainland yet. However, the administration in Washington, D.C. is aware of the threat and is pushing North Korea to pursue domestic economic progress instead of the development of nuclear weapons.

In order to achieve this goal, the United States pressed for a full denuclearization of North Korea and derailed the rapprochement attempt in Hanoi in February 2019. President Trump demanded a disassembly of all nuclear sites and a comprehensive list of weapons in North Korea and earned a firm refusal from Kim Jong-un in return.

From Kim’s standpoint, Trump’s demand is unacceptable because nuclear weapons are the country’s most effective means by which to secure the survival and continuity of the North Korean government. The administration in Pyongyang hopes that Washington will accept North Korea’s existence as a nuclear state and will withdraw its military forces from South Korea and Japan. Furthermore, North Korea is urging the South Korean government under President Moon Jae-in to abandon its strong ties with the United States and to side with North Korea in its effort to ease U.S. sanctions.

During the conference in Hanoi, Kim anticipated full sanctions relief from the United States. This also contributed to the collapse of the diplomatic talks. In exchange for his demands, Kim offered to dismantle the DPRK’s major nuclear facility, the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center. The U.S. did not accede to these conditions and instead imposed further sanctions in mid-March. North Korea subsequently sent a signal of disapproval and withdrew from the joint liaison office with South Korea in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between the two Korean countries. Satellite images captured mid-April indicate that North Korea may have restarted its nuclear weapons program by moving radioactive material near the Yongbyon Uranium Enrichment Facility and the Radiochemistry Laboratory.

In the future, risks will continue to arise out of the current situation if both the U.S. and North Korea continue to pursue large-scale demands and remain unwilling to make concessions. In order to gain North Korea’s attention and trust, the U.S. will have to adopt a more balanced approach regarding threats and promises. If President Trump fails to reach a more refined understanding of North Korea’s point of view, substantial diplomatic successes will be difficult to achieve in the future. As nuclearization permits North Korea to co-exist with military giants such as the United States and China, it seems unlikely that the country will abandon its nuclear ambitions. In addition, the DPRK would be effectively defenseless after a complete denuclearization, given that the North Korean military may surpass that of South Korea in number but is technologically inferior in comparison with its southern neighbor.

Pressuring the DPRK with economic sanctions has not delivered successes in the past and presumably will not draw North Korea out of its shell in the future. Since the 1990s, stop-and-go developments in nuclear non-proliferation agreements have defined international engagements with North Korea. After repeated nuclear tests since 2006, the first U.S.-North Korea conference in 2018 heralded a move towards a peaceful solution. A successful third summit may include a peace treaty between North and South Korea as well as smaller agreements regarding denuclearization and the easing of sanctions.  

While war on the Korean peninsula is not beyond the realm of possibility, the administrations in the United States, South Korea, and North Korea appear to all view this option as a last resort. This would explain the three parties’ willingness to engage in additional negotiations. Nonetheless, the risk remains that North Korea or the U.S. might make a misstep and frustrate each other once again. This could continue the stand-off revolving around U.S. sanctions and North Korea’s nuclear program. In such a case, the U.S. would soon face greater threats as North Korea would further refine its missile and nuclear technology.

About the Author

Yasemin Zeisl

Yasemin Zeisl earned her MSc in International Relations and Affairs from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Yasemin is fluent in German and English and possesses advanced Japanese language skills.

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