2018 was a critical year for the development of hypersonic weapons. Russia conducted two tests, one in March and one in December, that accelerated the race among a small group of states to attain hypersonic weapons. Aside from Russia, these countries are the United States, China, Australia, Japan, India, and France.
Researchers have had their eyes on hypersonic vehicles since the 1950s. Recently, however, it has seemed that the potential military uses of hypersonic technology will soon to be fulfilled. The Russian government reported that it plans to deploy the Avangard, a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), by around 2020. Similarly, the US anticipates the completion of its own hypersonic weapons program sometime in the early to mid-2020s.
The lethality of hypersonic weapons lies in their impressive speed of Mach 5 and above, potentially reaching Mach 10. This means that they fly at a minimum of 5 times the speed of sound, giving them a minimum speed of roughly 3,800 mph (6,200 km/h). They can either destroy targets with the sheer kinetic energy of a hypersonic impact, or they can carry nuclear warheads. Given their incredible speed, the kinetic energy released during impact can cause severe destruction. In addition, hypersonic velocity reduces response times significantly, giving the attacked party very little time to detect and defend against these threats. The synergy of speed, agility, and accuracy means that military hypersonic technology can become both a great risk and a great advantage for warring states.
There are two types of hypersonic weapons: hypersonic cruise missiles and hypersonic boost-glide vehicles. Hypersonic cruise missiles are faster versions of existing cruise missiles and are fueled by rockets or jets during the entire flight. Hypersonic boost-glide weapons are launched on top of ballistic missiles, are fired midcourse, and then shoot through lower altitudes, unlike common re-entry vehicles. It is important to note is that low flight enables them to evade radar detection.
The players at the center of the hypersonic development race are the US, Russia, and China. The US has commissioned major arms and defense corporations, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, to develop hypersonic strike weapons, tactical boost-gliders, and an air-launched rapid response weapon, the AGM-183A. In comparison, a look at Russia’s spending profile reveals that the country presumably plans to deliver nuclear and non-nuclear bombs with gliders like the Avangard. Simultaneously, Russia is developing hypersonic anti-ship and land-focused missiles like the Kinzahl or the 3M22 Zircon. China also aspires to fully attain hypersonic weapons by approximately 2020. China’s arsenal includes the Wu-14, a HGV, and the Xingkong-2, a hypersonic missile. What differentiates western states like the US from Russia or China is that western states have to overcome higher bureaucratic hurdles to advance hypersonic weapons programs, whereas the latter enjoy the benefit of more streamlined defense and security institutions that back the government’s military aspirations.
The capabilities of hypersonic technology bear a number of implications for defense strategists. Fixed defense systems like the United States’ Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) or Russia’s S-500 may be able to protect certain zones from hypersonic attacks within target range. The positioning of such systems, however, leaves wide areas uncovered and vulnerable to hypersonics, which are particularly dangerous and unpredictable because they can quickly switch targets in mid-flight. An array of possible defense options may mitigate this capacity, however. The US Missile Defense Agency suggested that orbital sensors may allow interceptors to effectively locate hypersonic missiles or gliders. Other options include high-power lasers or electromagnetic beams that could obstruct an attack. The crucial point is that governments should focus not only on offensive assets but also on suitable defense systems.
The advent of hypersonic capabilities in the military realm also entails a reduction of decision-making timespans. Strategists and operators will have to assess and react to threats faster. This is a general trend as new technologies increasingly shape warfare in both physical space and cyberspace. While this operational shift can be a disadvantage, new options such as artificial intelligence may be able to create an advantage by quickly sorting information to support decision-makers.
