The EU’s New Central Asia Strategy Promises Little Change

Central Asia is of strategic importance to the European Union (EU), China, and Russia as a geographic bridge as well as a buffer zone. On May 15, 2019, the EU attempted to renew cooperative efforts with Central Asian countries when it published its New Central Asia Strategy, an updated version of a partnership policy with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan that was first initiated in 2007. The new cooperation strategy highlights the aim to strengthen regional cooperation, improve private sector competitiveness, and open markets.

At the center of the New Central Asia Strategy are the keywords resilience, prosperity, and cooperation. Under these umbrella terms fall values such as the promotion of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, economic modernization, social development, and environmental protection. The EU also encourages Central Asian partners to accede the World Trade Organization (WTO) for improved economic relations. Out of the five Central Asian countries, three are currently members of the WTO. These are Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan has expressed strong interest in WTO membership and is likely to accede the organization within the next years. Turkmenistan has previously expressed interest in becoming a member of the WTO, but no further steps have been taken since.

Mutual benefits of cooperation between Central Asia and the EU are largely economic. The EU is a major trading partner of Central Asia, accounting for one-third of foreign trade in the region. Goods that Central Asian countries mainly supply the EU with are crude oil, natural gas, metals, and cotton fiber. The value of these exports rose from 13.7 billion Euro (15.4 billion USD) in 2016 to 21.9 billion Euro (24.6 billion USD) in 2018. In contrast, EU exports to Central Asia remained relatively stable between 2016 and 2018. In 2016, EU exports amounted to 8.3 billion Euro (9.3 billion USD) and increased only slightly until 2018 with the value reaching 9.1 billion Euro (10.2 billion USD). More than 50% of exported products from the EU to Central Asia are machinery, transport equipment, and manufactured goods.

A comparison between cornerstones of the EU-Central Asia strategic partnership of 2007 and 2019 demonstrates that both the old and the new version of the initiative fit into the larger framework of EU values, which are centered on democracy, a rules-based order, and human rights. While EU authorities have mapped out specific plans to implement these values, efforts to realize these goals appear to fail due to their lacking feasibility. While trading cooperation has delivered successes, the EU’s endeavors to democratize the region have shown limited success. The political situation in Kazakhstan has not changed significantly after the strategic partnership was commenced. Uzbekistan may be an exception in the region, but political change was not brought about by EU efforts. After Uzbekistan’s leader Islam Karimov died in 2016, reforms have induced progress that has led the country away from economic and political isolation towards greater liberties.

Considering that the political and legal dimensions of the EU’s Central Asia Strategy have largely remained unfulfilled, the question remains whether the EU should instead lay stronger focus on the economic aspect of the strategic cooperation. In contrast to Russia and China, the EU seems to lack clear, practicable goals in its partnership with Central Asia. China’s interest in Central Asia is evidently based on energy supplies, as Turkmenistan delivers vital natural gas resources to China. Furthermore, Central Asia functions as a crucial transit zone for China’s trade and investment-based Belt and Road Initiative. Russia and Central Asia are connected by a shared past, dating back to when all five Central Asian states were part of the Soviet Union. One of Russia’s main interest in its Central Asian neighbors lies in the abundance of cheap labor forces. Additionally, Central Asia is important to Russia’s security interests because the region provides a buffer zone, separating Russia from competitors. It is also a region in which Russia can exert political influence and assert power.

From the perspective of the EU, Central Asia functions as a space that is vital to EU security interests as well. Amicable diplomatic relations with Central Asian states are therefore beneficial to Russia, China, and the EU. While the EU’s new strategy maps out constructive, values-based goals that could aid development in Central Asia in the long term, the strategy is unlikely to produce significantly more success than the Central Asia Strategy of 2007. Nevertheless, Central Asia remains a strategically valuable partner for the EU, which is why the European bloc is expected to continue building trust with Central Asia.

About the Author

Yasemin Zeisl

Yasemin Zeisl earned her MSc in International Relations and Affairs from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Yasemin is fluent in German and English and possesses advanced Japanese language skills.

Contact Expert