The Effectiveness of Embargoes and Sanctions in Myanmar

A United Nations (UN) fact-finding mission confirmed in October 2018 that the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar continues to simmer, displacing thousands of people of the Rohingya ethnic group and forcing them to seek refuge in neighboring Bangladesh. During the peak of the conflict in 2017, approximately 700,000 Rohingya residing in Rakhine State in Myanmar fled to Bangladesh in order to escape the advances of the Burmese military. While the European Union (EU) and the United States have imposed sanctions and embargoes to limit Myanmar’s freedom of action since the 1990s, their effectiveness poses a challenge to policy decision-makers.

The origin of the strife between the Burmese military and the Rohingya population rests on conflicting ethnic and religious identities. The majority of Myanmar’s citizens are Theravada Buddhists, whereas most Rohingya are Muslim. Not only do the Rohingya face human rights abuses such as torture, rape, and murder due to their identity, but they are also discriminated against by the country’s governing authorities, who revoked their Burmese citizenship status in 1982. This left estimated total of 1.3 million Rohingya effectively stateless. Despite the fact that democracy was officially established under State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, the country is still under tight military control, which is preventing a full transition to democracy.

International sanctions and arms embargoes are common methods to contain violent conflict and limit human rights violations. While embargoes impose a complete ban, sanctions are a more moderate solution and can be more selective in their impact. U.S. sanctions on Myanmar focused on the restrictions of visas, the withdrawal of assistance to the country’s military, the freezing of assets, the reversing of investment flows, and cutbacks on financial aid. In August 2018, the U.S. administration penalized four Burmese military and border guard commanders and two security force units with economic sanctions for the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya population. The issue underlying this constraint is that it was relatively selective and did not target higher-ranking military officials.

The EU’s approach to halting internal repression in Myanmar is similar, but puts greater weight on military restrictions. In April 2019, the EU extended its arms embargo on Myanmar by a year until April 2020. The EU also enforced sanctions on 14 top military and border officials through travel bans and asset freezes. Additionally, the European block will not collaborate with Myanmar on military training.

Given that sanctions and embargoes have shown only limited effects on the behavior of the Burmese military over the years, the function of these restrictive methods can be seen in demonstrating that something is being done about the crisis. These methods fulfill a symbolic purpose by assuaging the international community as well as critical domestic media platforms.

What impedes the efficacy of sanctions and embargoes is the world of politics and strategic partnerships. Diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Myanmar may be under stress due to differing positions on human rights issues, but Myanmar’s strategic relevance in Southeast Asia, its gradual democratization efforts, and its wealth of natural resources act to temper U.S. sanctions on Myanmar. Situations like these often limit the utility and effectiveness of sanctions and embargoes.

While the EU arms embargo demonstrates the EU’s attempts to end internal repression in Myanmar, it does not stop the country from gaining access to military equipment elsewhere. Myanmar’s major arms suppliers are China, Russia, India, Israel, and the Ukraine. These states provide Myanmar with armored vehicles, artillery, naval vessels, missiles, and aircraft China in particular is a key strategic partner for Myanmar. China relies on Myanmar as ally because of the state’s access to the Indian Ocean and because of the two countries’ partnership in China’s global economic Belt and Road Initiative project. Furthermore, China seems to agree with Myanmar on the management of ethnic minorities within state borders, as it applies similar tactics in its management of its Uyghur population in the province of Xinjiang. As a veto power-wielding member of the United Nations Security Council, China is in a position to halt efforts to change the situation in Myanmar, limiting the power of the UN to engage in serious reprisals.

Although successes are often hard to achieve, sanctions and embargoes may draw international attention to conflict cases and put pressure on state authorities to take further action. Myanmar’s army reported in March 2019 that it would establish a military court to investigate crimes during the peak of the crisis in 2017. Myanmar’s corroded judicial system, however, shows little sign of this recent development.

About the Author

Yasemin Zeisl

Yasemin Zeisl earned her MSc in International Relations and Affairs from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Yasemin is fluent in German and English and possesses advanced Japanese language skills.

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